The premise for this collection of a decade of essays is here.
Today I realized that the collection is about to start hurtling toward the two phenomena that, while they were both totally unpredictable, at least by me, when I was writing these essays, seemed to explode straight out of the stuff I was wrestling with and pushed my whole thing into its freakout climax.
Those twinned, explosive phenomena are: 1) “Hamilton: An American Musical”; and 2) the presidency of Donald Trump.
We’re getting there.
But not quite yet. Today’s post, from the blissful ignorance of 2013, takes a break from beating up on the liberal consensus and beats up instead on Grover Norquist’s distorted view of George Washington. Here it is: “Washington’s Birthday and Public Debt.”
Next up will be a post from ’14. As I said, we’re accelerating — toward the abyss.
The premise for this collection of a decade of essays is here. Today’s re-post, from Boston Review, late 2012, is on liberalism’s misguided effort to adopt its own form of what’s long been known, in conservative circles, as originalism.
The immediate political context of the day involved passage of the Affordable Care Act, the Roberts court’s upholding its constitutionality, the Tea Party movement’s so-called “constitutional conservatism,” and left-liberal criticism of Obama, with direct reference to what were then new books: Drift, by Rachel Maddow; The Mendacity of Hope by Roger Hodge; Republic, Lost, by Lawrence Lessig; and Covenant of Liberty by Michael Patrick Leahy. The underlying history issue: modern, misleading projections on James Madison by smart thinkers across the political spectrum. (Only four years ago — wow. Again, seems like a long time.) Having spent so much time on Hamilton, this was my first foray into criticizing the anti-Hamilton forces, both liberal and conservative, who think there’s a founding-era antidote to Hamiltonianism in Madison-Jeffersonianism.
Here it is: “Founding Fathers, Founding Villains.”
Next in the collection here.
The premise for this collection of a decade of essays is here. Sheer historiographical nerdery this, #7, from 2012: how and why, after WWII, founding-history scholarship bailed on the political history of 18th-century class struggle and took up the intellectual history of 18th-century political ideas: “Douglass Adair and the Triumph of Founding Ideas over Founding Action” (wow, great title).
The next in the series is here.
(Messing around with the unwieldy title of this collection. Premise for this collection is here.) Here’s the blog post from 2011 in which I first realized that my broad-spectrum criticism of American founding history — from the rise of the postwar liberal consensus in the scholarly profession itself to the history-tourism industry to bestselling founding-father books to political speeches and so on — is really about a failed American civics. And that instead of blaming the people for supposedly not knowing anything, we should be blaming the intelligentsia that forever bemoans the people’s supposedly not knowing anything. I think this one may have especially weird resonances, post 2016: “The Constitution, the Citizens, and the Futility of Teaching Civics.”
Next in the series is here.
The premise for these posts is here. This is the fifth entry in the series: another long read from Boston Review, orginally published in 2010.
Here I think I’m making my first specific lob at liberal commentary itself — favored liberal modes of thought, really — for failing, in the wake of a rise in right-wing populism, to address the historical origins of what’s called liberalism and what’s called “populism” (a term so loaded now that I find it almost impossible to use clearly). Some of what’s in this essay will seem weird in light of how things have really developed — the focus on Sarah Palin, for one thing — and yet I think a lot of it may play, in debate over sources of the current crisis, anyway.
“Liberalism has long defined itself from a position of expertise and wisdom that it justifies as meritocracy, and for which it keeps reflexively congratulating itself.” To some, of course, the “paranoia” of a Chip Berlet or a Frank Rich may seem now to be fully realized.
Anyway, here it is: “Real Americans“.
(Next item in the series: here.)
The premise for these posts is here. This is the fourth entry in the series: three briefer blog posts from 2010:
— On John Yoo, George W. Bush, and the painful history of presidential overreach (with reference as well to the case of one of the Guantanamo prisoners).
— On President Obama’s enthusiastic endorsement of some truly bad-history TV.
— And, very briefly, on Obama’s inexplicable description of the history of progressivism in Supreme Court decisions.
One thing I’m somewhat startled to see going on in the 2008-2010 essays is a quandary over President Obama as a constitutional scholar and “historian-in-chief”– I think I threw up my hands on that one pretty quick.
Also, since we’re talking ’08-’10, I can feel the presence of the financial and foreclosure crises, never referred to directly in these history essays and posts, yet thanks to the Tea Party and Occupy soon to get me into the big discussion of regressiveness in Alexander Hamilton’s founding-era finance policy that I’ve been involved in, on and off, ever since.
Funny to recall now that the Hamilton fetish was already well underway in Bush-Obama economic-policy circles — Henry Paulson, the Brookings Institution, Peter Orszag, etc. — when the musical wasn’t a gleam in anyone’s eye.
(Next item in the collection: here.)
The premise for these posts is here. This is the third in the series: another longread, also originally published in Boston Review, at the end of that big year of ’08 (the trip will soon speed up, I promise).
This is “Constitutional Conventions,” on the abject failure of the National Constitution Center, which had recently opened. This was the most mainstream of mainstream history-tourism destinations, with a board staffed by professional historians and legal scholars, and man, talk about a toxic effect on public understanding of the nation’s origins. This kind of big institutional effort is one reason we don’t have a real civics. Ten years later, we can see the effects of that absence everywhere we look.
The essay also contains inchoate beginnings of the critique of the postwar U.S. history consensus that I mounted in the 2012 book Founding Finance (much of the historiography in the version linked above– references to Gordon Wood, Edmund Morgan, Jesse Lemisch — I ended up cutting from the version published in book form in Inventing American History, in ’09, by Boston Review and MIT Press).
(Next item is here.)